Unfortunately, the game theory models developed by post-Chicago economists do not offer universal conditions that could be used by competition authorities as a safe checklist in their rule for analyzing the causes of the link. What these models propose is a series of screens to determine whether antitrust authorities should investigate and ultimately condemn an engagement agreement. First, economic theory shows that commitment can only have plausible anti-competitive effects if a company has significant market power in the employment market and is subject to imperfect competition in the related market. We can protect these cases from any other consideration. Second, it is possible to build models – or stories – in which the link can be anti-competitive. However, these models are based on assumptions that should be verified by examining the facts for a particular case. We can eliminate some engagement cases because explanations of how these links can cause anti-competitive damage do not stand up to objective scrutiny. Third, there is a class of business binding for which it is plausible, given the actual circumstances, that the links affect competition. However, these links, like most links, can improve efficiency by reducing costs or improving quality. These “dodgy” links must be balanced against the pro-competitive effects in order to determine whether these links are generally detrimental to consumers. (5) The probability of an exit from competitors Competitiveness can be profitable privately if it leads to a market lockdown.
Exit can be difficult to predict, however, as its probability depends on a) the demand links between related and related products (product complementarity, positive/negative correlation between consumer assessments for the two products); and b) market conditions that go beyond the use of fixing strategies; Z.B. the degree of product differentiation, the level of overhead costs of the competitor, his debt capacity, etc.152 For at least three decades, the Supreme Court defined the necessary “economic power” to encompass almost any deviation from perfect competition, until the possession of a copyright or even the existence of a tie itself gave rise to a presumption of economic power.  In the meantime, the Supreme Court decided that an applicant must determine the market power necessary for other cartel violations in order to demonstrate sufficient “economic power” to establish one.  More recently, the Court struck down any presumption of market power solely on the basis of patenting or copyright of the binder product.  Because of these particular characteristics, some policy conclusions, such as the effectiveness of engagement by other less restrictive means, were questionable: Tetra Pak II91 In this case, it was also a question of linking consumables to the sale of the primary product.